Wierenga No A-Theorist Either by Craig, William Lane
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers 
Volume 21 Issue 1 Article 7 
1-1-2004 
Wierenga No A-Theorist Either 
William Lane Craig 
Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy 
Recommended Citation 
Craig, William Lane (2004) "Wierenga No A-Theorist Either," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of 
Christian Philosophers: Vol. 21 : Iss. 1 , Article 7. 
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol21/iss1/7 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative 
exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. 
WIERENGA NO A-THEORIST EITHER 
William Lane Craig 
The defender of the coherence of divine timelessness, divine omniscience, and 
a tensed theory of time may either argue that no incoherence has been shown 
in the notion of a timeless being's knowing tensed facts or else provide an 
account of divine omniscience according to which a deity who is ignorant of 
tensed facts may still count as omniscient. With respect to the first strategy, I 
took Wierenga to be arguing that in grasping present-time propositions 
involving a time's haecceity God is able to know the tensed propositional con-
tent or facts expressed by tensed sentences, even though such grasping does 
not in God's case issue in beliefs de praesenti. In his reply, Wierenga makes it 
clear that in his first proposal he is not offering a defense of God's knowledge 
of tensed facts at all, so that this proposed account does not even pretend to 
offer an account of God's knowledge of tensed facts. With respect to the sec-
ond strategy, Wierenga characterizes as misleading my description of his view 
as allowing that there is a "multitude of objectively true propositions which 
remain unknown to God" and that temporal persons "know not merely that p 
is true at t; they know p simpliciter, an objectively true proposition of which 
God is ignorant." But if Wierenga's re-definition of omniscience is intended to 
preclude propositions expressed by tensed sentences' being simply true, then 
he will have preserved divine omniscience only at the expense of denying the 
tensed theory of time. In that case, the second strategy proves no more suc-
cessful in defending the coherence of divine timelessness, divine omniscience, 
and a tensed theory of time than the first strategy. 
Edward Wierenga is one of the most subtle and careful thinkers to have 
tackled the various conundrums of divine omniscience, and I am grateful 
for his reply to my critique of his defense of the coherence of divine time-
lessness, divine omniscience, and a tensed theory of time.! I want at the 
outset to endorse heartily his fundamental claim that any adequate discus-
sion of this subject must involve an account of what the objects of knowl-
edge and belief are, as well as a statement of what is required for omni-
science. I have elsewhere tried to survey the various proposals currently 
on offer and have tried to show that on none of them can a timeless being 
have knowledge of tensed facts and that therefore, given a tensed theory of 
time, such a being does not qualify as omniscient or, at least, maximally 
excellent cognitively.2 
Now there are two broad strategies available to the defender of the 
coherence of divine timelessness, divine omniscience, and a tensed theory 
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of time: either to argue that no incoherence has been shown in the notion 
of a timeless being's knowing tensed facts or else to provide an account of 
divine omniscience or of the objects of knowledge according to which a 
deity who is ignorant of tensed facts may still count as omniscient. I took 
Wierenga to be pursuing both of these strategies. 
With respect to the first strategy, I took Wierenga to be arguing that in 
grasping present-time propositions involving a time's haecceity God is 
able to know the tensed propositional content or facts expressed by tensed 
sentences, even though such grasping does not in God's case issue in 
beliefs de praesenti. I took it that for Wierenga a time's haecceity involved 
the tense determination presentness, just as on his view a person's haecceity 
involves the property being me. In his fourteenth footnote of his reply 
Wierenga expresses confusion concerning the question of whether a time's 
haecceity involves its tense. This question is, however, crucial in my opin-
ion, and by it I mean, in effect, to ask whether the times whose haecceities 
are under discussion are, in Wierenga's view, moments of an A-series or 
moments of a B-series. Since the relations among times discussed by 
Wierenga are tenseless B-relations, the haecceities must belong to times in 
an A-series and include their respective A-determinations, if God is to pos-
sess knowledge of tensed facts in grasping propositions involving such 
haecceities. 
In reading Wierenga's reply, I now see that I was mistaken in interpret-
ing him to be offering a defense of God's knowledge of tensed facts at all. 
For now he clearly states that according to his account the propositional 
content expressed by tensed sentences and known timelessly by God is, in 
fact, tenseless: "Craig's summary of the view is accurate enough, except 
that he represents me as holding that 'tense belongs to the propositional 
content of tensed sentences, so that God must ... know tensed facts' (228). 
I think instead that tense is a feature of language; the view under consider-
ation says that tensed sentences express eternal (tenseless) propositions." 
This view is the standard B-Theory of Language. Wierenga writes, 
' ... it turns out that what God knows are wholly tenseless proposi-
tions, not present-time propositions.' Craig goes on to suggest a way 
in which I 'could escape this conclusion.' However, since that is the 
conclusion for which I was arguing, I have no desire to escape it. Craig 
identifies a feature of the proposal, not a flaw: although we know dif-
ferent propositions at different times, those propositions are eternally 
true, and God can thus know them without being himself in time. 
Wierenga thus affirms that his temporal haecceities do not include a time's 
tense determination, so that God's knowledge is restricted to tenseless 
facts. Hence, we may simply set to the side the (admittedly interesting) 
discussion of the alleged deficits and defenses of this proposed account/ 
since it does not even pretend to offer an account of God's knowledge of 
tensed facts. 
The upshot is that the whole weight of the defense of the coherence of 
divine timelessness, divine omniscience, and a tensed theory of time falls 
on the second strategy. I indicted Wierenga's account as an unacceptably 
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ad hoc revision of the traditional definition of omniscience because the 
ostensibly perspectival nature of truth is not a sufficient condition for 
exempting knowledge of a certain class of propositions from the concept of 
omniscience. On Wierenga's definition a being could count as omniscient 
even though he is ignorant of an infinite number of true propositions .. 
This is just not what we ordinarily mean by "omniscience." 
Wierenga's main responses to this objection is intriguing and revealing: 
... it is somewhat misleading to describe the view as allowing that 
there is a 'multitude of objectively true propositions which remain 
unknown to God' and that temporal persons 'know not merely that p 
is true at t; they know p simpliciter, an objectively true proposition of 
which God is ignorant.' For the perspectival propositions which God 
does not know are not really true simpliciter but only relative to or at 
some index or other. 
In rejecting these characterizations of his view, Wierenga has, in effect, 
abandoned a tensed theory of time. 
For on a tensed theory of time there is a time which is uniquely and 
objectively present. Therefore, propositions which are true at some time t 
but false at some other time t' are simply true when t is present. It is the 
tenseless theory of time which trades in truth simpliciter for truth at a time. 
Since no time is ever uniquely and objectively present, it makes no sense to 
ask what just is true, simpliciter. Rather one must index truth to times. 
Such times are ordered in a tenseless B-series, not in an A-series, for if 
times are tensed, then there is a time which is simply present and proposi-
tions true at this time are simply true. Just as serious actualists reject the 
indexical account of actuality espoused by modal realists like David Lewis 
in favor of an account according to which propositions are simply true 
rather than merely true in W, so serious tensed time theorists reject an 
indexical account of presentness in favor of an account according to which 
propositions expressed by tensed sentences are simply true rather than 
merely true at t. If time is tensed, then, as I said in my critique, a definition 
of omniscience which takes account of the times at which propositions are 
true will look, not like Wierenga's, but like Davis's definition 
0": 5 is omniscient = df For all p, if pat t, then it is true at t that S 
knows that p and does not believe -po 
If Wierenga's definition is intended to preclude any propositions' being 
simply true, then he will have preserved divine omniscience only at the 
expense of denying the tensed theory of time. In that case, the second 
strategy proves no more successful in defending the coherence of divine 
timelessness, divine omniscience, and a tensed theory of time than the first 
strategy. Like Kvanvig/ Wierenga turns out to be no A-theorist either! 
Talbot School of Theology 
LaMirada, California 
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NOTES 
1. Edward Wierenga, "Omniscience and Time, One More Time: A Reply 
to Craig," Faith and Philosophy, vol. 21, no. 1 (January 2004); in response to 
William Lane Craig, "Omniscience, Tensed Facts, and Divine Eternity," Faith 
and Philosophy 17 (2000): 225-241. 
2. See my trilogy on God and the nature of time: The Tensed Theory of 
Time: A Critical Examination, Synthese Library 293 (Dordrecht: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 2000); The Tenseless Theory of Time: A Critical Examination, 
Synthese Library 294 (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000); God, 
Time, and Eternity (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001). 
3. Consider, for example, my charge that Wierenga fails to give a plausi-
ble account of our beliefs de praesenti. Any such account must explain our 
belief states and the cognitive significance which grasped propositional content 
has for us. In his reply Wierenga, however, explains, "my proposal is about 
the propositional content of belief, where that is understood as concerning the 
propo:;itions that are believed." This is, in effect, to concede my point, for an 
account of the propositional content of our beliefs does nothing to explain the 
cognitive significance our beliefs de praesenti have for us. My remarks on the 
analogy between our beliefs de se (expressed by personal indexicals) and our 
beliefs de praesenti (expressed by temporal indexicals) are aimed at Wierenga's 
account as an account of our belief states, not of the propositional content of 
our beliefs. 
4. Wierenga rightly points out that his definition of omniscience does not 
restrict God's knowledge to tenseless truths. But I plead innocent to his charge 
that I have misunderstood him here, for when I say, "In Wierenga's view God 
has knowledge of propositions stating exclusively tense less B-facts," I mean by 
"Wierenga's view" his view of God, not his definition of omniscience. 
5. Wierenga does present two independent arguments to motivate his 
revised definition, both of them arguments from analogy: (i) Omniscience is 
analogous to omnipotence, which is properly restricted in certain ways. I find 
this argument to be very weak, however. For the reason omnipotence is suit-
ably circumscribed is that the bald claim that omnipotence means the ability to 
do anything (universal possibilism) is incoherent, whereas the standard defini-
tion (If omniscience (0) is not. In any case an acceptable definition of omnipo-
tence places no non-logical limit on God's power, as Wierenga's definition 
does on omniscience. (ii) Knowledge of tensed facts is analogous to knowl-
edge of personal facts, which are appropriately indexed. This is the best argu-
ment for Wierenga's redefinition, for there does seem to be a tight analogy 
between facts expressed by personal and temporal indexicals (as opposed to 
spatial indexicals, since there are no objective spatial "tenses"). But this analo-
gy could at most motivate (though it would not require) treating personal and 
temporal indexicals alike; it would not motivate Wierenga's way of doing so. 
To avoid the charge that his definition is ad hoc, he would have to show that 
competing analyses of such indexicals are less plausible than his account. Still, 
Wierenga could claim that his account of the objects of knowledge offers at 
least one plausible solution to the problem posed by indexical words, so that 
his solution is open to the defender of divine timelessness without being ad hoc. 
But I doubt that his account does provide a plausible solution. For indexing is 
a way of eliminating, not preserving, perspectival content. When it is claimed 
that "Chicago is here" is true at location l, the idea is that the propositional con-
tent c-f that sentence is spatially neutral but is truly expressed perspectivally by 
someone at 1. In the same way, indexing personal and temporal indexical sen-
tence3 to persons and times would eliminate private propositions and truth-
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variable propositions. But Wierenga clearly understands his account to pre-
serve perspectival propositional content, for he provides as examples of such 
propositions I am sitting and It is sunny now. Thus, Wierenga's account seems 
to be incoherent. (If one does advocate a view according to which propositions 
are both personally neutral and tenseless, then my remarks on pp. 235-236 of 
my original article become relevant.) 
6. See William Lane Craig, "Kvanvig No A-Theorist," Faith and Philosophy 
18 (2001): 377-380. 
